Neural Unpredictability, the Interpretation of Quantum Theory, and the Mind-Body Problem
arXiv Preprint Archive August 6, 2002 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper examines two common interpretations of quantum theory: that quantum states represent states of knowledge and that quantum theory is merely a theory of correlations. It argues these views face serious problems regarding psycho-physical parallelism and defining probabilities for individual future observations based on past ones. The complexity is highlighted by the claim that unpredictability in ordinary neural functioning, stemming from small-scale molecular uncertainties, may vastly outweigh conventionally recognized sources of quantum uncertainty. After considering and rejecting several possible solutions, the author proposes that a complete understanding of the relationship between subjective experience and its physical correlates requires new mathematical definitions and new physical laws.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Quant-ph |
| Key finding | Proposes that understanding the relationship between subjective experience and physical correlates demands new mathematical definitions and physical laws. |
Abstract
It has been suggested, on the one hand, that quantum states are just states of knowledge; and, on the other, that quantum theory is merely a theory of correlations. These suggestions are confronted with problems about the nature of psycho-physical parallelism and about how we could define probabilities for our individual future observations given our individual present and previous observations. The complexity of the problems is underlined by arguments that unpredictability in ordinary everyday neural functioning, ultimately stemming from small-scale uncertainties in molecular motions, may overwhelm, by many orders of magnitude, many conventionally recognized sources of observed ``quantum'' uncertainty. Some possible ways of avoiding the problems are considered but found wanting. It is proposed that a complete understanding of the relationship between subjective experience and its physical correlates requires the introduction of mathematical definitions and indeed of new physical laws.