V1 as an egocentric cognitive map.

The primary visual cortex (V1) is typically regarded as an egocentric perceptual map, while the hippocampus is seen as an allocentric cognitive map. This article argues that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map, with three well-documented functions—estimation of distance, estimation of size, and multisensory integration—better understood as cognitive inferences. This implies that V1 must serve as the neural correlate of the visual perception/cognition distinction, which can be accommodated by its laminar structure. The authors propose a low-level account of visual consciousness, contrasting with mid-level and higher-level accounts, and argue that equating visibility with detection thresholds is a mistake.

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Abstract

We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article, we argue that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map. We argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (i) the estimation of distance, (ii) the estimation of size, and (iii) multisensory integration, are better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. This argument has two important implications. First, we argue that V1 must function as the neural correlates of the visual perception/cognition distinction and suggest how this can be accommodated by V1's laminar structure. Second, we use this insight to propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory) and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). Detection thresholds have been traditionally used to rule out such an approach, but we explain why it is a mistake to equate visibility (and therefore the presence/absence of visual experience) with detection thresholds.