The Force of Experience: A Biophysical Hypothesis of a Confined Interaction in Living Neural Systems
Biological Theory March 12, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s13752-026-00534-x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Physicalism Causation Agency philosophy Meaning existential Philosophy of biology Mechanism biology Living systems Constructive Epistemology Cognitive science Materialism Philosophy of science Experiential learning Energy signal processing Phenomenon |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Proposes that subjective experience acts as a confined physical force that biases neural logic gates, providing a biophysical mechanism for mental causation. |
Abstract
Abstract Standard physicalism often renders subjective experience epiphenomenal, while interactionist accounts struggle to reconcile mental causation with energy conservation. We propose the force of experience : a real, physically efficacious force exerted by experience on neural architecture. To address the objection that a fundamental force should act universally, we introduce biological confinement, analogous to the confinement of the strong nuclear interaction. The force of experience acts exclusively on structured biological information—the coherent, meaning-bearing informational patterns sustained within the living brain. Within the brain’s open thermodynamic system, experience supplies the causal influence required to bias activation barriers of neural logic gates, releasing stored metabolic potential in a direction determined by the meaning of the experience and the organism’s prior experiential history. This framework reconceives subjective experience as a confined physical force essential for biological agency and clarifies how meaning-driven interactions can be both constructive and destructive. We situate this proposal within historical perspectives on mental causation, including agential realism, dispositional causation, and nonreductive materialist psychology, while offering a biophysical mechanism absent from prior accounts.