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Using Spinoza to Address Experiences of Selfhood within Existential Anxiety and Self-Referential Processing in Depersonalization-Derealization

Jeremy Cooper

preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/usb5m_v1 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Anxiety Ego dissolution
Key points Proposes that Spinoza's conatus offers a useful lens for conceptualizing self-referential processes in depersonalization-derealization disorder and existential anxiety.

Abstract

Presentations of existential anxiety within depersonalization-derealization disorder both present as symptoms to be reduced and highlight a particular trend for understanding self-referential processes. In offering a possible neurophenomenological conceptualization of how oneself attempts to understand oneself through the course of experiencing existential anxiety, a lens through Spinoza’s conatus may offer insight. This argument seeks to combine Spinoza’s conatus with insights from lived experience in an attempt to better understand the nature of self-referential processes, how one distinguishes who they are as a person amidst the demands of the environment around them. This argument will present a conceptualization of how conatus functions that aligns with the current findings and can be used to inform clinical recommendations and future research into the neurophenomenological program and dissociative disorders as a whole.

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