Toward a Falsifiable Physical Basis for Numerical Conscious Identity: The Ψ-I Hypothesis

Numerical conscious identity—why one individual rather than an identical duplicate continues to experience consciousness—lacks a physical explanation in existing theories. The Ψ-I hypothesis proposes that this identity depends partly on a non-clonable quantum-information component that interacts weakly with neuroelectromagnetic dynamics without replacing established neurophysiology. The hypothesis yields five falsifiable predictions in single-neuron electrophysiology, cortical traveling waves, magnetoencephalography, terahertz spectroscopy, and neural response thresholds, each defining a measurable residual relative to validated conventional models. No direct evidence currently supports Ψ-I; its scientific value depends entirely on rigorous experimental testing.

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Abstract

Subjective experience remains tied to the same individual despite continuous turnover of the brain’s physical components. Existing theories explain conscious content, neural mechanisms, and information processing, but none specifies the physical basis of numerical conscious identity or explains why one individual, rather than an identical duplicate, continues to experience consciousness. I propose the Ψ-I hypothesis: numerical conscious identity depends in part on a non-clonable quantum-information component that interacts weakly with neuroelectromagnetic dynamics without replacing established neurophysiology. The hypothesis yields five falsifiable predictions in single-neuron electrophysiology, cortical traveling waves, magnetoencephalography, terahertz spectroscopy, and neural response thresholds. Each prediction defines a measurable residual relative to validated conventional models and states explicit falsification criteria. No direct evidence currently supports Ψ-I; its scientific value depends entirely on rigorous experimental testing and the outcome of those tests.