Mindscape Collective is now The Consciousness Library. Same library, new name. You may need to sign in again. About the change
Skip to content

Meaning as Interbeing: A Treatment of the WE-turn and Meta-Science

Andrej Zwitter

Open Philosophy January 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2025-0086 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Meaning arises not from individual minds or material objects alone but as an emergent property at the intersection of proto-meaning and epistemic frames. Drawing on Deguchi's relational ontology of the WE-turn and a meta-ontological perspective called Meta-Science, the argument critiques subjectivist and materialist accounts of meaning for their limitations. It introduces the concept of proto-meaning: non-epistemic relational structures underlying experience that bridge the non-epistemic and epistemic realms through interbeing. Meaning proper emerges from irreducible interdependencies between objects and their semblance to non-epistemic archetypal patterns engraved in all relationships. Meaning is thus layered, relational, and conditioned by ontological premises.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Meaning existential Argument complex analysis Materialism Subjectivism Ontology
Key finding Argues that meaning emerges as "interbeing" from irreducible interdependencies between epistemic and non-epistemic objects and their semblance to non-epistemic archetypal structures.

Abstract

Abstract This article develops a conception of meaning in the sense of “meaning as interbeing,” i.e., meaning as an emerging property in the intersection between proto-meaning and epistemic frames. The foundational basis of this argument is built on two streams of thought, Deguchi’s relational ontology of the WE-turn and the meta-ontological perspective of what is discussed in this article as Meta-Science. The article first discusses the problem of the emergence of meaning based on the limitations of subjectivist and materialist conceptions of meaning. It then builds upon the WE-turn’s incapability theses to define ontologies and their limitations, specifically their propositional incompleteness. Finally, it develops the concept of proto-meaning, i.e., the non-epistemic relational structures that underlie experiences and explain how the non-epistemic and the epistemic are bridged through interbeing to form meaning proper. The argument presented here, thereby, reframes meaning as emergent from irreducible interdependencies between objects (both epistemic and non-epistemic) and the recognition of their semblance to non-epistemic archetypal structures that are engraved in all relationships as proto-meaning. Meaning is, thus, conceived as interbeing: a layered, relational emergence grounded in archetypal patterns and conditioned and filtered by ontological premises.

Comments

No comments yet.

Log in to comment