The Extended Body Hypothesis
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.20 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that while bodily awareness can extend to tools, there are important limitations to sensations felt in tools, and even in peripersonal space, the boundaries of skull and skin remain significant. |
Abstract
Abstract According to the extended mind hypothesis, “There is nothing sacred about skull and skin” for our cognitive abilities (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Is this also true for bodily awareness? In this chapter I consider several versions of what we can call the extended body hypothesis. According to a weak version, bodily awareness is not limited by the biological boundaries of our body. In light of tool embodiment, I highlight the malleability of embodiment but also show that there are important limitations to the sensations that we can feel in tools. I then consider a stronger version of the extended body hypothesis, according to which bodily awareness is not even constrained by the apparent boundaries of the body. I will describe how we can experience sensations in peripersonal space, but argue that even then there seems to be something sacred about our apparent skull and skin.