Attention-Gated Virtual Sensorium: A Bandwidth-Limited Architecture for Consciousness-like Organization in Artificial Embodiment
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 21, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20779862 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Softmax function Embodied cognition Cognitive architecture Theory of computation Virtual agent Artificial life Bounded function Artificial intelligence Human–computer interaction Cognitive science Virtual reality Cognitive robotics Virtual machine Nonlinear system Episodic memory |
| Key points | Proposes that artificial consciousness-like states should be modeled as finite-bandwidth, attention-gated integration of sensory and interoceptive information rather than complete access to world-state information. |
Abstract
This paper proposes the Attention-Gated Virtual Sensorium (AGVS), a theoretical architecture for artificial consciousness-like organization in simulated or virtual embodiment. The central claim is that artificial consciousness-like states should not be modeled as complete access to world-state information. Instead, they should be modeled as finite-bandwidth, body-mediated, attention-gated integration of sensory and interoceptive information. AGVS introduces a virtual sensorium consisting of vision, audition, touch, olfaction, gustation, and interoception. These sensory channels are not processed equally or exhaustively. They are dynamically allocated according to precision-weighted prediction error, goal relevance, memory cues, nonlinear bodily need, emergency urgency, and processing cost. The theory further introduces dynamic conscious-like bandwidth B_max(t), dynamic softmax temperature tau(t), nonlinear bodily need N_i*(t), metacognitive monitoring, selective episodic memory encoding, and mood-like long-term modulation. These components allow the agent to exhibit functional signatures such as attention capture, fatigue-induced narrowing, pain-like priority shifts, uncertainty about its own perception, selective autobiographical memory, and recursive self-state updating. The paper does not claim to prove phenomenal consciousness. Rather, it defines architectural and computational conditions under which an artificial system may become organized in a consciousness-like way. The main conclusion is that subject-like artificial agents should not be designed as omniscient world-state readers, but as bounded virtual bodies that experience partially, predict imperfectly, remember selectively, and update themselves through limited embodied perception. Interdisciplinary fields: Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Consciousness, Embodied AI, Cognitive Science, Predictive Processing, Active Inference, Computational Neuroscience, Affective Computing, Philosophy of Mind, AI Safety, Human-Computer Interaction