Candrakīrti on the Use and Misuse of the Chariot Argument
Journal of Indian Philosophy June 15, 2023 DOI: 10.1007/s10781-023-09544-6 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Chariot Argument complex analysis Epistemology Philosophy of religion Epicureanism |
| Key points | Argues that Candrakīrti’s chariot argument in MA 6.150–165 functions as a meditation guide to refute ego-identification, not as a theory of self or not-self. |
Abstract
Abstract The publication in 2015 (ed. Li) of Chap. 6 of the rediscovered Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) allows us to witness more directly Candrakīrti’s careful and deliberate critique of the ‘chariot argument’ for the merely conventional existence of the self in Indian Abhidharmic thought. I argue that in MA 6.140–141, Candrakīrti alludes to the use of the chariot argument in the Milindapañha as negating only the view of a permanent self (compared to an elephant), rather than negating ego-identification (compared to a snake in its hole). In contrast to this misuse of the chariot argument, in MA 6.150–165 Candrakīrti uses the chariot argument as an allegory to enable the meditator to refute the basis of ego-identification in seven ways. Candrakīrti’s use of the chariot argument does not establish any theory about the self or not-self, but acts as a guide to meditation as part of philosophy as a spiritual practice with the goal of liberation.