Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.28 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that subjective measures of consciousness lack a clear notion of subjective access, which makes the problem of response bias less tractable. |
Abstract
In recent years, the divide between conscious and unconscious perception has been the focus of a thriving research area in the science of consciousness. Subjective measures, frequently referred to as ‘introspective measures’, play a prominent role in this literature and have been the subject of intense criticism. This chapter discusses the main types of subjective measures used in current-day science of consciousness. I explain the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of a putatively ever-present response bias. I then turn to the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked out notion of subjective access. In turn, as I explain, this makes the problem of response bias less tractable than it might otherwise be.