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Structuralism in the science of consciousness. Editorial introduction

Sascha Benjamin Fink, Andrew Y. Lee

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences February 9, 2026 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2025.12733 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Consciousness Ontic Field mathematics Foundation evidence Epistemology Variation astronomy
Key points Proposes that the proper aim of the science of consciousness is to investigate the structures of conscious experiences, and that a structuralist research program should be established.

Abstract

Conscious experiences have many structural features. Consider how your color experiences have dimensions of variation corresponding to hue, saturation, and brightness, how your visual acuity decreases in precision from the center of your visual field to the periphery, how your pain experiences come in different magnitudes, or how your temporal experience seems to flow in a continuous stream. ‘Structuralism’, in the most general sense, may be defined as an approach to consciousness research where the central aim is to investigate the structures of conscious experiences. Given this broad definition, there are many varieties of structuralism. As examples, methodological structuralists think that scientific methods give us knowledge only about structural features of consciousness, while ontic structuralists think that all there is to consciousness is structure. But even those who deny those claims might still think that the proper aim of the science of consciousness is to investigate structure. The aim of this special volume is to bring these dispersed discussions together by organizing a collection of articles about the structures of conscious experiences and the roles that structure ought to play in consciousness research. The goal is to set a foundation and an agenda for a structuralist research program in the scie­nce of consciousness.