The Ontological Status of Visions and Hallucinations.
June 4, 2022 DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/vmakg (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe abstract questions the criteria used to distinguish real from unreal perceptions. Hallucinations in schizophrenia are deemed unreal because they are not shared, yet visions of religious figures or angels, and sightings of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena by multiple witnesses, are also not shared. The text asks whether such anomalous experiences, when sincerely believed, should also be considered unreal, and whether an ontology that accepts them as real could be coherent and logically defensible.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Vision Perception Psychology Ontology Schizophrenia object-oriented programming |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key finding | Argues that the criterion of shared experience for distinguishing real from unreal perceptions is logically problematic when applied to anomalous experiences such as religious visions or UFO sightings, and questions whether an ontology accepting all such experiences as real can be coherent. |
Abstract
Which perceptions are real, and which are not? The aural and/or visual hallucinations of patients with schizophrenia are deemed ‘unreal’, because they are experiences not shared by any of the people around them; but the same is, and has been, true of people who have had visions of the Virgin Mary, other saints, or – as in the case of the Romantic poet, William Blake – angels. Still others, including multiple witnesses at a time, have seen Unidentified Aerial Phenomena. Are these ‘anomalous experiences’, where sincerely believed in by those claiming to have had them, also ‘unreal’? What is ‘reality’? Would an ontology that accepted any or all such experiences as real be coherent and logically defensible?