Skip to content

The Ontological Status of Visions and Hallucinations.

Richard Michael Blaber

June 4, 2022 DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/vmakg (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Keywords Vision Perception Ontology Schizophrenia object-oriented programming Visual hallucination Aesthetics Romance Epistemology Psychoanalysis
Citations 1
Key points Argues that the criterion of shared experience for distinguishing real from unreal perceptions is logically problematic when applied to anomalous experiences such as religious visions or UFO sightings, and questions whether an ontology accepting all such experiences as real can be coherent.

Abstract

Which perceptions are real, and which are not? The aural and/or visual hallucinations of patients with schizophrenia are deemed ‘unreal’, because they are experiences not shared by any of the people around them; but the same is, and has been, true of people who have had visions of the Virgin Mary, other saints, or – as in the case of the Romantic poet, William Blake – angels. Still others, including multiple witnesses at a time, have seen Unidentified Aerial Phenomena. Are these ‘anomalous experiences’, where sincerely believed in by those claiming to have had them, also ‘unreal’? What is ‘reality’? Would an ontology that accepted any or all such experiences as real be coherent and logically defensible?

Citations in the library