A cosmopsychist-panentheistic metaphysics inspired by the 11th-century Indian philosopher Rāmānuja offers a solution to the hard problem of consciousness that is preferable to other comparable views, and can ground a panentheistic conception of God compatible with human free will. The authors argue that Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-dualism) Vedānta provides a more satisfactory account than the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, which has been the focus of most cross-cultural studies linking panpsychism and Indian philosophy.
Russellian panpsychism holds that all fundamental physical entities have inner experiential properties. A major challenge is the combination problem: how micro-experiences combine into the unified experiences of larger beings like humans. This paper defends a Leibnizian version of panpsychism, which denies that micro-experiences ever combine. The authors address two objections: that denying combination (mereological nihilism) is implausible, and that Leibnizian panpsychism implies human experiences are simple physical entities. They argue both objections can be answered and that this view deserves serious consideration as a theory of consciousness.