Intrinsic Computational Functionalism: From Observer-Relative Maps to Observer-Independent Structures
June 4, 2026 Shu Ma, Ryota Kanai School Of Philosophy, F. University et al.
Anti-computational arguments show that externally imposed computational interpretations cannot ground consciousness, but they do not establish that all computational organisations are observer-relative. The authors develop intrinsic computational functionalism: the view that, if consciousness is computationally constituted, it depends on physically realised computational structures the system has in virtue of itself rather than on labels imposed by an external interpreter. Two criteria operationalise this view: system-intrinsic instantiation and causal-dynamical organisation under intervention. The argumentative core is a three-tier decomposition of identification work. The authors argue that syntax-is-not-semantics arguments, mapmaker arguments, and the observer-relativity component of biological-naturalist objections succeed against views that locate the consciousness-relevant property at tier (i); once the tiers are distinguished, intrinsic computational functionalism survives.