Panpsychism vs. the Zombie Argument
Journal of Consciousness Studies June 1, 2022 Harry Cleeveley
The zombie argument against physicalism holds that if philosophical zombies—beings identical to humans but lacking conscious experience—are possible, then physicalism is false, and either zombies are possible or panpsychism is true. Giberman (2015) argues that the mere possibility of panpsychism rules out the possibility of zombies, thereby defeating the zombie argument. This paper contends that Giberman's argument fails because it confuses two senses of possibility. Using two-dimensional semantics, the zombie argument requires zombies to be possible in a specific sense (2-possible), which is incompatible with panpsychism being possible in that same sense. However, Giberman only shows panpsychism is possible in a different sense (1-possible), which does not conflict with the relevant possibility of zombies. Thus, the anti-zombie argument does not succeed.