The Concept of Qualia in Human Experience
Advances in Computational Intelligence and Robotics December 12, 2025 Arpita Nayak, Ipseeta Satpathy, Vishal Jain
The essay examines qualia—the subjective, ineffable aspects of experience—as fundamental elements of consciousness that shape affect and interpretation. It critically reviews classical arguments by Thomas Nagel, Daniel Dennett, and David Chalmers on the ontology and explanatory challenge of qualia. Dennett opposes their existence, arguing the concept dissolves once mental operations are understood, while Nagel defends the epistemic inaccessibility of subjective experience via his 'what it is like' formulation. Chalmers highlights the hard problem of consciousness, where materialism cannot explain subjective experience. The analysis explores whether computing architectures can bridge the gap between information processing and genuine experience.