Inattentive Perception, Time, and the Incomprehensibility of Consciousness.
Frontiers in Psychology January 1, 2021 Jürgen Krüger
The brain's energy supply cannot sustain continuous neural processing of all constant objects we perceive, so it limits resources to changes. Neural activity is thus temporally discontinuous, mirroring the role of time in fundamental physical equations. This Hypothesis proposes that the transition from neural activity to conscious experience reflects a phenomenal 'solution': time-constant entities are 'filled-in' via integration, even though neural data only captures changes. Qualia serve as 'initial conditions' for this integration, and phenomenal identity (versus high similarity) relates to qualia. Inattentive vision appears rich because percepts accumulate over time, while attentive perception relies on present signals. Experimental support includes transient neural responses to sustained stimuli, filling-in, and change blindness.