A general model of Functional Neurological Disorders (FND) proposes that these disorders may arise from a consciously initiated voluntary top-down process that produces involuntary lasting consequences, which the patient then consciously experiences and interprets as involuntary. The model is developed within the Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness, which describes interactions between conscious and non-conscious cognitive processes. A list of predictions for empirical testing is presented, and the model reinterprets the debated links between hypnotic suggestion and FND. The theoretical paper aims to bridge psychiatric and neurological perspectives on FND with advances in cognitive neuroscience of consciousness.
Patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC), such as vegetative state (VS) or minimally conscious state (MCS), offer a unique way to test theories about consciousness by dissociating vigilance from conscious experience. This article reviews major findings in DoC research, proposes a taxonomy, and highlights limitations. A purely behavioral approach is insufficient to assess conscious state. Comparing MCS and VS does not provide a clean contrast between conscious and unconscious states. Based on resting-state PET data, behavioral MCS reflects a cortically mediated state that does not necessarily imply preserved consciousness.