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Denis Perrin

2 papers in the library · 1 citation · publishing 2022-2024

Papers

Immersing oneself into one’s past: Subjective presence can be part of the experience of episodic remembering

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences February 19, 2024 Denis Perrin, Michael Barkasi 1 citation

A common view holds that episodic remembering allows us to relive many features of a past perceptual experience, but not its sense of presence. This paper challenges that view by distinguishing two kinds of presence in perception: temporal presence and locative presence, the latter having objective and subjective sides. While temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in remembering, the authors argue that subjective locative presence—the feeling of being immersed in a scene—can be. They identify self-projection, imaginative pretence, and attentional focus as mechanisms underlying subjective locative presence in quasi-perceptual imagination, and note that these same mechanisms underpin episodic remembering. They conclude that episodic remembering can indeed relive subjective locative presence, a position they call 'mnemonic immersivism,' with implications for understanding memory, imagination, and the phenomenology of remembering.

A leaky evidence accumulation process for perceptual experience.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 1, 2022 Michael Pereira, Denis Perrin, Nathan Faivre

Perceptual experiences are not static but fluctuate as a leaky evidence accumulation process (LEAP), where confidence corresponds to the peak accumulated evidence. This proposal extends evidence accumulation models from decision-making to explain the dynamics of conscious perception itself, suggesting that percepts fade in and out of consciousness independent of tasks. The account offers a mechanistic understanding of phenomenal qualities like intensity and duration, moving beyond simple detection. Limitations and implications for neural correlates of consciousness are discussed.