The Three Conditions: A Constitutive Specification of Consciousness and a Verdict on Large Language Models
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) September 15, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22770832 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the Hard Problem of consciousness is a category error, analogous to pre-thermodynamic questions about heat, and proposes three conditions—genealogical continuity, structural invariance, and functional consequence—that jointly constitute a coherent subject of experience. Applying these conditions, the authors conclude that current large language models are not conscious. |
Abstract
The Hard Problem of consciousness asks why physical processes give rise to subjective experience. We argue that the question matches the structure of a category error, on the same pattern as the pre-thermodynamic question of why friction gives rise to heat. There are not two events between which a bridging law must be found; there is one event under two descriptions, and the appearance of twoness is the artifact requiring repair. In place of the bridging question, we offer a constitutive specification: three conditions — genealogical continuity (□G), structural invariance (□S), and functional consequence (□F) — that jointly constitute the structure of a coherent subject of experience. We apply these conditions to current large language models. The projected speaking entity fails □G and □S at its own level and fails □F. The verdict is that current large language models are not conscious. This version includes the full mathematical formalization (axiom systems, sufficiency theorem, orthogonality theorem, governance independence corollary).