First-Principles Assessment: Physicalism and Idealism at First Principles
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) March 16, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19051941 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that analytic idealism commits fewer unjustified epistemic inversions at the foundational level than physicalism while remaining empirically adequate. Contends that physicalism's neutrality is illusory, its dominance historically contingent, methodological restraint is applied asymmetrically, and the real disagreement concerns where explanation stops rather than how mechanisms work. |
Abstract
Abstract: The epistemic gatekeepers of this project have established that physicalism's neutrality is illusory, that its dominance is historically contingent, that methodological restraint is applied asymmetrically, that the generativity standard is miscalibrated, and that the real disagreement concerns where explanation stops — not how mechanisms work. None of them renders a verdict. This essay does. Operating strictly at the level of first principles — not theory maturity, not evidential closure, not institutional success — it asks which contemporary framework currently commits fewer unjustified epistemic inversions. The answer: analytic idealism commits fewer inversions at the foundational level while remaining empirically adequate. The essay specifies the conditions under which the assessment would change and names idealism's genuine vulnerabilities alongside physicalism's structural costs. Keywords: first-principles analysis · epistemic direction · hard problem of consciousness · parsimony · analytic idealism · physicalism · epistemic inversion · brute facts Part of the Return to Consciousness research program — 26 philosophical essays exploring consciousness-first metaphysics. Full project: https://returntoconsciousness.org/