Topological Field Theory of Consciousness: Universal Hyperscaling in Human Neural Matter (N=21)
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) March 21, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19144032 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Observational EEG study Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 21 |
| Population | Human subjects undergoing propofol sedation |
| Intervention | Propofol |
| Key findings | The authors report that the conscious state is characterized by a hyperscaling ratio H of approximately 1.53 ± 0.02, invariant across sensory conditions and stable under TMS, while propofol anesthesia drives a first-order phase transition to a trivial topological state (Q=0, H approaching 1.0) preceded by critical slowing (autocorrelation AR1 rising from 0.80 to 0.97). They argue this constant distinguishes consciousness from standard self-organized criticality and identifies the neural field as belonging to the O(3) Wilson-Fisher universality class. |
Abstract
We present empirical validation of a Topological Field Theory of Consciousness (TFTC) wherein subjective awareness is modeled as a persistent topological soliton with winding number Q=1. Analyzing high-density EEG (62 channels, 5000 Hz) from 21 subjects undergoing propofol sedation, we demonstrate that the conscious state occupies a distinct universality class characterized by a hyperscaling ratio H = (τ-1)/(α-1) ≈ 1.53 ± 0.02. This value is invariant across sensory conditions and stable to external perturbation (TMS). Pharmacological induction of anesthesia drives a first-order phase transition to a trivial topological state (Q=0, H→1.0) preceded by critical slowing down (autocorrelation AR1: 0.80→0.97). The 1.53 constant distinguishes consciousness from standard self-organized criticality (SOC) and identifies the neural field as belonging to the O(3) Wilson-Fisher universality class. These findings establish a quantitative, falsifiable boundary between conscious and non-conscious states, offering a path toward a formal physics of subjective experience.