It takes… three! Enhancing phenomenological evidence in the triangulation approach to aesthetic experience
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Murray Smith's triangulation proposal leaves the concrete use of phenomenological evidence underexplored and treats its reliability inconsistently. Proposes examining phenomenological evidence through three questions—its nature, methods of gathering, and reliability—with attention to "micro-phenomenology" as developed by Claire Petitmengin within Francisco Varela's neuro-phenomenological framework. |
Abstract
At the heart of Murray Smith’s proposal of a methodological “triangulation” is the principle that in our research we take into serious account three levels of analysis, with their respective types of evidence: the phenomenological level; the psychological level; and the neurophysiological level. However, the author’s trust in phenomenological evidence appears to be fluc-tuating, and the issue of how to concretely take advantage of it appears underex-plored. On this grounding, I will address the broad topic of a rigorous usage of phenomenological evidence by touching upon three main points: 1) The nature of phenomenological evidence; 2) The methods to gather phenomenological evi-dence; 3) The reliability of this type of evidence. In my discussion, I will focus on a particular method stemming from Francisco Varela’s neuro-phenomenological framework and developed by Claire Petitmengin, i.e. “micro-phenomenology”.