When the World Becomes Too Large: Consciousness as a Finite-Capacity Boundary Phase

A finite-capacity boundary-phase model proposes that consciousness arises not from complexity or scale but when a self-maintaining system faces more distinction demand than it can represent without losing its own boundary. The model introduces three scaling variables—boundary-capacity ratio, residue-pruning ratio, and self-boundary coupling—to identify when sentience becomes scientifically plausible. Consciousness is distinguished from compression, reportability, intelligence, and prediction. Qualia are interpreted as boundary-valenced compression geometry, and the explanatory gap is attributed to the limits of finite report maps. Applications span infant consciousness, neural systems, artificial consciousness, and thought experiments, with a layered falsification registry.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Official website: distinctiontheory.orgPublic portal for the start guide, papers, claim status, failure registry, prior-art boundary, and citation resources. Canonical GitHub repository:https://github.com/yiningwu-research/Distinction-Theory FDS-C2 proposes a finite-capacity boundary-phase model of sentience in active finite distinction systems. The central claim is that consciousness is not a smooth reward for complexity, information integration, model size, or parameter scaling. Rather, consciousness is modeled as a dissipative phase that becomes scientifically plausible when an active self-maintaining system encounters more boundary-relevant distinction demand than it can represent losslessly while preserving its own boundary. The paper introduces three core scaling variables: the boundary-capacity ratio Λφ, the residue-pruning ratio Πφ, and self-boundary coupling Iself. A system is treated as a sentience candidate only when boundary-relevant demand exceeds effective self-maintenance capacity, pruning remains within a viable dissipative window, and internal updates causally affect future boundary-maintenance loss. The framework distinguishes sentience from mere compression, reportability, passive information processing, intelligence, and large-scale prediction. It interprets qualia as boundary-valenced compression geometry and locates the explanatory gap as the null space of finite report maps from high-dimensional self-maintenance dynamics to public symbols. The paper develops applications to: the transition from reportable access to phenomenal structure; qualia and the explanatory gap; infant consciousness from 0 to 2 years; thalamocortical, limbic, interoceptive, sleep-dependent, and neuromodulatory systems; artificial consciousness and the limits of parameter scaling; boundary thought experiments, including sensory deprivation, accelerated cognition, short-term self-continuity, passive compression, and embodied artificial agents; reduced numerical simulations for capacity-wall crossing, pruning-window dynamics, sleep-like reset, trauma-like rigidification, overpruning/dissociation, infancy-like self-model development, and artificial-agent sentience thresholds; a layered falsification and demotion registry for formal, physical, neurocognitive, AI-domain, and metaphysical claims. FDS-C2 is explicitly presented as a consciousness bridge theory, not as a theorem of the formal FDS core and not as a proof that consciousness has been solved. Its purpose is to define a falsifiable boundary condition for when sentience becomes scientifically plausible in finite active systems. A compact statement of the thesis is: Consciousness is not what happens when a system becomes large. It is what happens when a self-maintaining finite system becomes too small for its world. This work is part of the broader Finite Distinction Systems research program, following the formal FDS core and the C1 theory of reportable access under finite capacity.