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The Structural Conditions of Consciousness VI.5— Final Volume — — From Information to Event — Reformulating the Qualia Problem Beyond Structural Knot Theory

Nagae Mamoru

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 27, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20958527 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The hard problem of consciousness—why experience feels like something—remains unsolved, but Structural Knot Theory has clarified a significant structural portion of the problem. By intentionally excluding qualia, the framework isolates what it calls the structural container of subjectivity: five conditions (autonomous action, a boundary constraining continued existence, multiple internally generated candidates, exclusive and irreversible determination, and formation of a single irreversible history) that, when simultaneously satisfied, structurally commit a system to one irreversible line of existence.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed
Keywords Qualia Consciousness Subjectivity Event particle physics Grasp
Key finding Argues that Structural Knot Theory identifies five conditions that structurally fix subjectivity, thereby clarifying a significant structural portion of the problem of consciousness, but does not explain qualia.

Abstract

Chalmers was right.The hard problem remains hard. However, this does not mean that Structural Knot Theory has failed. The central claim of this paper is that the intentional exclusion of qualia was not a retreat from the problem of consciousness, but a necessary scientific procedure. By separating the structural problem of subjectivity from the phenomenal problem of qualitative appearance, Structural Knot Theory was able to isolate what may be called the structural container of subjectivity: the set of conditions under which a system becomes bound to a single irreversible history. The preceding volumes argued that subjectivity is not a substance, a representation, or an intrinsic informational state. Rather, it is structurally fixed when five conditions are simultaneously satisfied: autonomous action, a boundary constraining continued existence, multiple internally generated candidates, exclusive and irreversible determination, and the formation of a single irreversible history. When these conditions converge, possible futures are contracted into one realized trajectory. The system is no longer merely processing information; it is structurally committed to one irreversible line of existence. This result does not explain qualia. It does not explain why pain feels painful, why red appears as red, or why experience has phenomenal texture at all. But it does achieve something substantial. By identifying the structural container of subjectivity, the framework makes possible a structural judgment concerning the presence or absence of consciousness, a tentative estimation of its degree, a design recipe for artificial subjectivity, and a reorganization of existing theories of consciousness according to the roles they play within or around that container. Integrated information, global availability, predictive processing, embodiment, affect, viability constraints, and action selection need not be treated as mutually exclusive explanations of consciousness itself. They can instead be repositioned as partial mechanisms, enabling conditions, implementation layers, or functional correlates within a larger structural account. In this sense, Structural Knot Theory may have solved a significant structural portion of the problem of consciousness. It does not solve consciousness as a whole, but it may clarify where subjectivity is structurally established, how it can be evaluated, how it might be artificially constructed, and how existing theories can be placed in relation to one another. Precisely because of this achievement, the remaining problem becomes sharper. Once the structural container of subjectivity has been isolated, the unresolved problem is no longer simply how information becomes complex, integrated, represented, or functionally available. The deeper question is why information, once fixed within a single irreversible history, ever appears as an event. The remaining target is therefore not consciousness in its entire undifferentiated mystery, but the transition from information to event: the still-unclear relation between information, irreversibility, determination, history formation, and phenomenal appearance. This paper does not solve the hard problem.It attempts to show what part of the problem may already have been structurally clarified, and what remains after that clarification has reached its limit.

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